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Abstract
Rationale Disorders of compulsivity such as stimulant use disorder (SUD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are
characterised by deficits in behavioural flexibility, some of which have been captured using probabilistic reversal learning
(PRL) paradigms.
Objectives This study used computational modelling to characterise the reinforcement learning processes underlying patterns of
PRL behaviour observed in SUD and OCD and to show how the dopamine D2/3 receptor agonist pramipexole and the D2/3
antagonist amisulpride affected these responses.
Methods We applied a hierarchical Bayesian method to PRL data across three groups: individuals with SUD, OCD, and healthy
controls. Participants completed three sessions where they received placebo, pramipexole, and amisulpride, in a double-blind
placebo-controlled, randomised design. We compared seven models using a bridge sampling estimate of the marginal likelihood.
Results Stimulus-bound perseveration, a measure of the degree to which participants responded to the same stimulus as before
irrespective of outcome, was significantly increased in SUD, but decreased in OCD, compared to controls (on placebo).
Individuals with SUD also exhibited reduced reward-driven learning, whilst both the SUD and OCD groups showed increased
learning from punishment (nonreward). Pramipexole and amisulpride had similar effects on the control and OCD groups; both
increased punishment-driven learning. These D2/3-modulating drugs affected the SUD group differently, remediating reward-
driven learning and reducing aspects of perseverative behaviour, amongst other effects.
Conclusions We provide a parsimonious computational account of how perseverative tendencies and reward- and punishment-
driven learning differentially contribute to PRL in SUD and OCD. D2/3 agents modulated these processes and remediated deficits
in SUD in particular, which may inform therapeutic effects.
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Introduction
Optimal functioning and wellbeing requires flexible adapta-
tion of behaviour to maximise rewards and minimise punish-
ments. Many psychiatric disorders involve aberrant process-
ing of, and responding to, rewarding and aversive experiences.
Compulsivity is a hallmark of stimulant use disorder (SUD)
and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), where behaviour
to obtain reward or avoid punishment, inappropriately per-
sists, resulting in undesirable consequences. In SUD, drug-
taking habits prevail despite the risk of family breakup or
job loss. Individuals with OCD are unable to desist repetitive
behaviours, which can consume large amounts of time and
ultimately compromise social or occupational functioning
(APA 2013).
Deficits in behavioural flexibility can be captured in a lab-
oratory setting using probabilistic reversal learning (PRL) par-
adigms (Lawrence et al. 1999). Adaptive behaviour involves a
trade-off between flexibly updating actions when the environ-
ment changes and ignoring rare events when the environment
is stable. PRL models this trade-off. Participants are presented
with two choices and learn by trial and error which option is
correct most of the time. Ignoring spurious minority feedback
leads to more rewards overall, and is thus adaptive. The con-
tingencies are then reversed, and participants must update
their choices tomaximise rewards again. In these experiments,
analysed using classical statistics, individuals with SUD show
perseverative deficits—impairments in the ability to update
behaviour when circumstances change (Ersche et al. 2008,
2011). Whilst patients with OCD also exhibit behavioural in-
flexibility, the most consistent evidence comes from the extra-
dimensional shifting paradigm, which requires shifting atten-
tion from one aspect of a compound stimulus to another, to
maximise reinforcement (Chamberlain et al. 2007a). The find-
ings on PRL in OCD, on the other hand, are mixed
(Chamberlain et al. 2007b; Ersche et al. 2011; Remijnse
et al. 2006). At the same time, individuals with depression
(Murphy et al. 2003; Taylor Tavares et al. 2008) instead show
hypersensitivity to spurious negative feedback in PRL, mani-
fested by inappropriately changing behaviour following pun-
ishment when it is rare. To our knowledge, however, nobody
has compared the microstructure of behaviour in PRL be-
tween disorders of compulsivity using computational models
of reinforcement learning (RL).
Techniques for analysing behaviour that are based on RL
describe the behaviour in question—for instance, choice—by
having a computer simulate putative psychological processes,
such as learning from reward or punishment, tending to
choose recently chosen stimuli or respond to recently
responded-to locations irrespective of outcome, and selecting
between alternative actions. These computational processes
are governed by parameters (e.g. a given subject’s tendency
to learn from reward, or from aversive feedback such as
errors). In turn, those parameters may be influenced by dy-
namic pharmacological manipulations and may vary accord-
ing to relatively static properties of the subject, such as psy-
chiatric disorders. The most likely values for those parameters
are discovered by fitting the predictions of a computational
RLmodel to actual behaviour. In the most informative kind of
analysis (Daw 2011), a Bayesian hierarchy is used. For exam-
ple, subjects are drawn from groups and are influenced by
drug manipulations, so the parameters pertaining to a given
subject in a given condition (or session) exist “beneath” the
level of groups and drugs; at the lowest level, trial-by-trial data
are predicted and compared to behaviour. Finally, the best RL
model may be selected from a number of competing alterna-
tives according to a formal Bayesian procedure, penalizing
models that fit badly or that are over-complex (Occam’s ra-
zor). Analysing behavioural data using a hierarchical
Bayesian RL approach therefore simultaneously allows the
best computational model of behaviour to be selected from
candidate models—allowing psychological processes to be
inferred—and the parameters of that model to be character-
ized, to uncover the effects of disorders or pharmacological
manipulations on those processes.
Here, we took a transdiagnostic approach to interrogate the
computational processes underlying maladaptive behaviour
across two disorders of compulsivity: SUD and OCD. We
applied RL models in a reanalysis of behavioural data on
PRL from Ersche et al. (2011), which enabled a direct com-
parison of these groups. The original study by Ersche et al.
(2011) also investigated the effects of the dopaminergic D2/3
receptor agonist pramipexole and the D2/3 antagonist
amisulpride. Using classical statistics, they showed
pramipexole remediated perseverative behaviour in SUD
and normalised the corresponding hypoactivity in the head
of the caudate; however, their analysis did not detect any fur-
ther effects of pramipexole or amisulpride in SUD, OCD, or
controls. We additionally sought to deconstruct the influence
of dopaminergic agents on computational processes underly-
ing PRL in these groups. Understanding D2/3 receptor in-
volvement in maladaptive behaviour is particularly important
given the evidence of reduced striatal D2 receptor availability
in cocaine abuse (Volkow et al. 1993), methamphetamine
abuse (Volkow et al. 2001), and OCD (Denys et al. 2004;
Perani et al. 2008; but see Schneier et al. 2008). D2/3 antago-
nists, additionally, are effective in augmenting first-line selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) therapy in treatment-
resistant cases of OCD (Fineberg et al. 2013).
The primary aim of our modelling approach was to deepen
our understanding of how SUD and OCD differ and overlap,
and to do so more robustly and with greater detail than the
conventional analyses previously reported. Using data from
Ersche et al. (2011), we asked whether behavioural differences
could be best accounted for by algorithms describing how
rewarding and punishing outcomes drive action, for instance,
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or if models incorporating additional elements tracking behav-
ioural tendencies independent of action-outcome contingen-
cies—“stickiness” parameters—would yield more optimal
characterisations. Experimental data showing abnormalities
in processing and flexibility adapting behaviour following re-
wards and punishments in SUD (e.g. Ersche et al. 2011, 2016)
and OCD (e.g. Gillan et al. 2011, 2014) suggest parameters
tracking separate reward and punishment learning rates would
be of central importance. We predicted separate learning rates,
for positive and negative outcomes, would be superior to a
single reinforcement rate, and could enable the detection of
asymmetries in appetitive and aversive processing—avoiding
negative consequences is a key feature of OCD (APA 2013),
and is not central in SUD, for instance. At the same time,
because compulsivity may stem from maladaptive stimulus-
response habits, where behaviour persists irrespective of out-
come (Everitt and Robbins 2016; Gillan et al. 2011, 2014), we
expected the addition of stickiness parameters would be opti-
mal. Finally, we asked whether our data would instead be
better characterised by a different model, used to dissect per-
severative behaviour (den Ouden et al. 2013), that tests the
balance of how incoming information is valued against cur-
rent beliefs (based on past experience). We expected that
analysing behaviour in this more sophisticated manner would
enable us to better differentiate the SUD and OCD groups and
characterise their response to dopaminergic agents.
Methods
Participants
The study included 56 participants, composed of 19
healthy volunteers, 18 patients with SUD, and 19 pa-
tients with OCD. Diagnoses of stimulant dependence
and OCD were ascertained using the structured clinical
interview for the DSM-IV (First et al. 2002). Here, we
use the term substance use disorder (SUD), which is the
current nomenclature in the DSM-V (APA 2013), rather
than stimulant dependence, as used in the DSM-IV-TR
(APA 2000). Within the SUD group, 10 participants met
DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000) criteria for cocaine/crack de-
pendence while 8 met criteria for amphetamine depen-
dence. Individuals with SUD had a history of illicit
stimulant dependence for a minimum of 2 years.
Participants did not have any other Axis I psychiatric
disorder at the time of the study and were not taking
any other medication aside from SSRIs in the OCD
group. Both the SUD and OCD groups, however, had
elevated depressive symptoms, which is reported in the
“Results” section. Use of illicit drugs, besides in the
SUD group, was an exclusion criterion. Participants
were assessed for their general health, which included
a physical examination and clinical blood tests at base-
line, and were excluded if they had a history of any
serious medical condition. The study was approved by
the Cambridge Research Ethics Committee and all par-
ticipants provided written informed consent. Further in-
formation on the three groups of participants, including
their demographics, baseline personality measures, and
clinical information are presented in Table 1.
General procedure
Participants attended three sessions, with 1 week between
each session. The task was conducted an hour after a single
dose of either placebo, a D2/3 agonist (pramipexole, 0.5 mg),
or a D2/3 antagonist (amisulpride, 400 mg), timed to coincide
with peak plasma concentrations. Three individuals with SUD
received 1.5 mg of pramipexole. All subjects contributed data
to the Bayesian analysis. One control participant contributed
only placebo data and one participant with OCD contributed
only amisulpride and pramipexole data, as they did not
complete all three sessions. One subject from the SUD
group, who contributed data from all three sessions, was
excluded from Ersche et al. (2011) due to a behavioural per-
formance cutoff. These three participants were not used for
subsequent analyses correlating model parameters with symp-
toms, and with the key behavioural measures reported in
Ersche et al. (2011). The experiment was conducted in an
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) scanner, how-
ever the imaging data were not reanalysed here. Further details
about the study procedure are described in Ersche et al.
(2011).
Serial probabilistic reversal learning task
Two visual stimuli were presented simultaneously, as
shown in Fig. 1, and participants were prompted to make
a choice by pressing one of two buttons. Stimuli were
presented for 2000 milliseconds, and if a response was
not entered in this period the screen would say “too late”.
Participants received immediate feedback 500 ms after a
response was made, in the form of a green face with a
smile or a red face with a frown, and learned by trial and
error which stimulus was correct most of the time. A
fixation cross appeared between trials for a variable
inter-trial interval lasting up to 3000 ms. Participants were
told that intermittently they would receive negative feed-
back even if they made the correct choice, which they
should ignore. Ignoring spurious minority feedback leads
to more positive feedback overall, and is thus adaptive.
They were also informed that the optimal response would
reverse several times throughout the task: the initially
correct response would lose its value and choosing the
other stimulus would then be optimal. There were two
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runs of 10 sequences, making for 18 response reversals.
Participants had to make at least 10 correct responses
cumulatively before the contingencies reversed; this crite-
rion varied from 10 to 15 to avoid participants anticipat-
ing the occurrence of a reversal. If, however, participants
did not reach the required number of correct responses,
the task stopped after the 200th trial of that run.
Misleading negative feedback to a correct response was
provided on about 15% of trials; this varied as a function
of when the reversal occurred. Participants completed an
initial practice run of 30 trials to familiarise themselves
with the task.
Ersche et al. (2011) focused on three main behavioural
measures in their conventional analysis: perseverative,
probabilistic, and spontaneous errors. A perseverative error
occurred when participants made at least one consecutive
choice of the previously correct stimulus immediately after
the reversal occurred, excluding any error on the first trial
of the reversal. They calculated a perseverative error rate
by dividing the number of perseverative errors by the num-
ber of sequences on which perseverative errors occurred.
Probabilistic switches were inappropriate switches from
the correct to incorrect stimulus following misleading neg-
ative feedback. Spontaneous errors occurred when partici-
pants switched from the correct to incorrect stimulus de-
spite receiving veracious positive feedback. More probabi-
listic switches and spontaneous errors is analogous to more
“lose-shift” and less “win-stay” behaviour, respectively—
terms used in other studies (e.g. den Ouden et al. 2013;
Rygula et al. 2015). Ersche et al. (2011) also reported the
average number of trials per sequence.
Computational modelling of behaviour
Overview
We fitted seven RL models to the behavioural data on PRL
from Ersche et al. (2011) using hierarchical Bayesian
methods, incorporating parameters that have been studied pre-
viously in the RL literature.
For all models, trials were sequenced across all trials in the
PRL task. For each trial, the computational model was in-
formed of the subject’s identity, the subject’s group and drug
condition, which stimuli were presented and where (left or
right side of the computer screen), the location (left or right)
of the subject’s response, and whether the trial was rewarded
or unrewarded.
The top level of the Bayesian hierarchy (Fig. 2)
pertained to group and drug: each RL parameter had a
group- and drug-condition-specific distribution. The next
level involved sessions for individual subjects: RL pa-
rameters for each subject in a given (drug) condition
were drawn from a normal distribution whose mean
was the group/drug mean (from the level above) and
whose variance represents inter-subject variability for
that parameter (implemented as a subject-specific devia-
tion from the group/drug mean). Through this process,
the computer established specific RL parameters for a
given set of trials. It then used them to govern an RL
model trained by the sequence of st imuli and
reinforcement.
We define t as the trial number, St as the stimulus chosen on
that trial, Lt as the location chosen on that trial, and Rt as the
Table 1 Demographic, psychological and baseline personality measures for the groups of healthy controls (HC; n = 18), individuals with stimulant use
disorder (SUD; n = 17), and individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 18). Mean (standard deviation)
Group HC SUD OCD F df P
Age (years) 32.7 (± 6.9) 34.3 (± 7.4) 35.4 (± 9.8) 0.49 2.50 0.618
Gender ratio (male/female) 15:3 14:3 7:11 0.318a
Ethnic ratio (Caucasian:Afro-Caribbean) 17:1 15:2 18:00 0.308a
Verbal intelligence quotient (NART) 108.4 (± 6.0) 108.0 (± 8.3) 107.9 (± 8.8) 0.06 2.50 0.938
Years of education 12.4 (± 1.8) 11.2 (± 1.0) 12.3 (± 2.0) 2.06 2.50 0.082
Dysphoric mood, BDI-II (total score at baseline) 1.1 (± 2.4) 9.8 (± 11.2) 18.5 (± 10.0) 18.07 2.50 < 0.001
Impulsivity, BIS-11 (total score) 62.0 (± 7.2) 81.7 (± 9.7) 66.9 (± 9.7) 22.83 2.49 < 0.001
Compulsivity, Y-BOCS (total score) 0.1 (± 0.5) – 24.11 (± 13.0) – – –
Compulsivity, OCDUS (total score) – 26.0 (± 7.8) – – – –
Age of onset (years) of stimulant abuse or of OCD – 20.5 (± 5.4) 17.1 (± 11.0) – – –
Duration (years) of stimulant abuse or of OCD – 11.7 (± 7.4) 18.3 (± 10.6) – – –
Reproduced with permission from Ersche et al. (2011)
NART National Adult Reading Test, BDI-II Beck Depression Inventory, version II (Beck et al. 1996), BIS-11 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, version 11
(Patton et al. 1995), Y-BOCS Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al. 1989), OCDUS Obsessive-Compulsive Drug Use Scale
(Franken et al. 2002)
a Fisher’s exact test
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reinforcement delivered on that trial. Each stimulus was
assigned an associated reinforcement-driven value V.
Models
Models are listed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 3 lists the models by
order of complexity and nestedness.
Model 1 employed two parameters and served to address
whether a simple reinforcement learning algorithm was suffi-
cient to best characterise behaviour between groups and under
different drug conditions. Reinforcement led to an increase in
value Vi of the stimulus i that was chosen, at a speed governed
by the reinforcement rate αreinf, according to Vi,t + 1← Vi,t +
αreinf (Rt – Vi,t), where Rt represents the reward on trial t (by
definition 1 on rewarded trials), and (Rt – Vi,t) the prediction
error. On nonrewarded trials Rt = 0, thus leading to a decrease
in the value of Vi. Stimulus value contributed to the final
quantity controlling choice via Qreinft = τ
reinfVt. The additional
parameter τreinf, termed reinforcement sensitivity, governs the
degree to which a subject is driven by its reinforcement histo-
ry. The quantitiesQ associated with the two available choices,
for a given trial, were then fed into a standard softmax choice
function to compute the probability of each choice:
P actionað Þ ¼ softmaxaβ Q1…Qnð Þ ¼
eβQa
∑nk¼1eβQk
for n = 2 choices with softmax inverse temperature β = 1. The
probability values for each trial emerging from the softmax
function (arbitrarily, the probability of choosing stimulus A)
were fitted to the subject’s actual choices (did the subject
choose stimulus A?). Note that since β = 1, the τ parameters
directly represent weights given to each component in the
softmax exponent.
Model 2 was as model 1 but additionally implementing the
concept of “stimulus stickiness”, making for three parameters.
This describes the tendency of a subject to respond again to a
specific perceptual stimulus (regardless of location) that it
chose on the previous trial, independent of outcome. This
model served to test whether a combination of parameters that
track both learning from action-outcome and stimulus-
response associations could better describe behaviour. We
added a stimulus stickiness parameter τstim and modelled this
effect as Qstimt = τ
stimst–1, where st–1 was 1 for a stimulus that
was chosen on the previous trial and 0 otherwise. The final
quantity governing behaviour now incorporated this new
component: Qt =Q
reinf
t +Q
stim
t. The quantities Q, associated
with the two available choices for a given trial, were likewise
fed into a standard softmax function as above.
Model 3 was as model 1, but instead of using one reinforce-
ment rate αreinf, we implemented separate learning rates for
rewarded outcomes, αrew, and nonrewarded outcomes, αpun.
These separate parameters enabled us to test our prediction
that groups would differ in how positive versus negative feed-
back guide behaviour, and to assess how dopaminergic agents
modulated these processes. Reward led to an increase in value
Vi of the stimulus i that was chosen, at a speed governed by the
reward rate αrew, according to Vi,t + 1← Vi,t + α
rew (Rt – Vi,t),
where Rt represents the reward on trial t (by definition 1 on
rewarded trials), and (Rt – Vi,t) the prediction error.
Punishment (nonreward) led to a decrease in the value of Vi
according to the punishment rate αpun, similarly: Vi,t + 1←
Vi,t +α
pun (Rt – Vi,t) for Rt = 0. Stimulus value contributed to
the final quantity controlling choice via Qreinft = τ
reinfVt.
Fig. 1 Schematic of the serial probabilistic reversal learning task, used
with permission from Ersche et al. (2011). Two abstract stimuli were
presented on either side of the screen, the participant selected one using
a button press, and feedback was immediately given in the centre of the
screen in the form of a green smiley face or a red frowning face. A
probabilistic error occurred when a participant received spurious negative
feedback after making the correct choice, which was rare and should
therefore be ignored. A reversal error, on the other hand, was one where
feedback was now truly negative, indicating the reversal had occurred,
contingencies have thus changed and behaviour should be updated
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Model 3 therefore had three parameters: αrew, αpun, and τreinf,
as per the “RP” model from den Ouden et al. (2013) (see
Supplementary Material).
Model 4a was as model 3, while additionally implementing
the concept of “side (location) stickiness”, a tendency to re-
peat responses to the side most recently chosen. This made for
four parameters. We asked whether capturing a different per-
severative tendency—behaviour bound to a location rather
than a specific visual stimulus—in addition to learning from
rewarded or unrewarded outcomes would better characterise
behaviour. The tendency to choose a location was governed
by the location stickiness parameter τloc, according to
Qlocl,t = τ
locLl,t–1, where Ll,t–1 represents the subject’s location
choice on the previous trial (1 if l was the previously chosen
location and 0 otherwise; for the first trial, this was 0 for both
sides indicating no “stickiness”). The final tendency to choose
a given stimulus at a given location was controlled by the
quantity Qt =Q
reinf
t +Q
loc
t. This model thus led to quantities
Q associated with the two available choices for a given trial.
Model 4b was the same as model 4a but implemented
stimulus stickiness instead of side stickiness, giving four
parameters. Given the SUD group from Ersche et al.
(2011) perseverated to a particular stimulus, we predicted
stimulus stickiness would be more informative than side
stickiness.
Model 4c was as model 3 (αrew, αpun, and τreinf) with the
addition of parameters for both stimulus stickiness and
side stickiness, giving five parameters. The final
quantity governing behaviour was therefore Qt =Q
reinf
t +
Qloct +Q
stim
t.
Model 5 used a different approach: experience-weighted
attraction (EWA; Camerer and Ho 1999), which was the win-
ning model in den Ouden et al. (2013) who used a single
reversal. This model is described elsewhere (and in the
Supplementary Material), but in brief, this model balances
the value of incoming information against current beliefs
(based on past experience). Learning from reinforcement is
modulated by an “experience weight” for a stimulus; the ex-
perience weight for a stimulus is updated every time it is
chosen, and its change over time is governed by a decay fac-
tor. In this model, the softmax inverse temperature β was also
a parameter able to vary. The learning rate can decline over
time in the EWA model. Because our paradigm employed
serial reversals, requiring new learning at several points, it is
possible this model may be more conducive to PRL with a
single reversal.
Bayesian hierarchy, illustrated for reward rate parameter
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rew[HC, placebo]
rew[HC, pramipexole]
rew[HC, amisulpride]
rew[SUD, placebo]
rew[SUD, pramipexole]
rew[SUD, amisulpride]
rew[OCD, placebo]
rew[OCD, pramipexole]
rew[OCD, amisulpride]
rew other parameters, similarly
behavioural experience
parameters of interest
(parameter contrasts of interest also sampled)
actual choices
predicted choice probabilities
model fitted so predictions are close
to actual behaviour, determining posterior
distributions of parameters
Priors
Group and drug level
(~, drawn from)
Session level
Subject structure
Trial-by-trial level
Prior for
ew
Prior for
intersubject
variability
0
Subject-specific
effects (deviations
from group mean)
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
0 1
Reinforcement learning
algorithm
brain
…
…
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
d
e
t
e
r
m
in
e
p
r
e
d
ic
t
io
n
s
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
in
s
p
a
r
a
m
e
te
r
s
~ ~ ~
~
~
~
~
r
Fig. 2 Schematic of the Bayesian hierarchy used in our analysis, illustrated here for a single parameter (reward rate). HC healthy controls
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Priors, fitting, and model comparison
Priors for the parameters are shown in Table 2. Models were
fitted using Hamiltonian Markov Chain Monte Carlo sam-
pling via Stan 2.17.2 (Carpenter et al. 2017). Convergence
was checked with the potential scale reduction factor measure
R^ (Gelman et al. 2013; Brooks and Gelman 1998), which
approaches 1 for perfect convergence; values below 1.2 are
typically used as a guideline for convergence and a cutoff of <
1.1 is a stringent criterion for convergence (Brooks and
Gelman 1998). The use of multiple simulation runs with
measurement of convergence is an important check for simu-
lation reliability (cf. Wilson and Collins 2019) and is an in-
trinsic part of Stan. We also verified parameter recovery from
simulated data for the winning model (see Supplementary
Material).
Models were compared using a bridge sampling estimate of
the marginal likelihood (Gronau et al. 2017a) via the
“bridgesampling” R package (Gronau et al. 2017b). This pro-
cedure directly estimates the marginal likelihood, and thus the
posterior probability of eachmodel, given the data, prior mod-
el probabilities, and the assumption that the models represent
Table 2 Model parameter prior distributions
Models using each
parameter
Prior Reference, if applicable
Model parameters
Reward learning rate, αrew 3, 4a, 4b, 4c Beta(1.2, 1.2) den Ouden et al. (2013)
Punishment learning rate, αpun 3, 4a, 4b, 4c Beta(1.2, 1.2) den Ouden et al. (2013)
Combined reward/punishment
learning rate, αreinf
1, 2 Beta(1.2, 1.2) den Ouden et al. (2013)
Reinforcement sensitivity, τreinf 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5 Gamma(α = 4.82,
β = 0.88)
Gershman (2016)
Location (side) stickness, τloc 4a, 4c Normal(0, 1) Christakou et al. (2013)
Stimulus stickness, τstim 2, 4b, 4c Normal(0, 1) Christakou et al. (2013)
Experience decay factor, ρ 5 Beta(1.2, 1.2) den Ouden et al. (2013)
Decay factor for previous
payoffs, φ
5 Beta(1.2, 1.2) den Ouden et al. (2013)
Softmax inverse temperature,
β
5 [note that β= 1
in all other
models]
Gamma(α = 4.82,
β = 0.88)
Gershman (2016)
Intersubject variability in parameters
Intersubject standard
deviations for αrew, αpun,
αreinf, τloc, ρ, φ
As above Half-normal: Normal(0,
0.05) constrained to
≥0
Intersubject standard
deviations for τreinf, β
As above Half-normal: Normal(0,
1) constrained to ≥0
Gershman (2016) but altered from Cauchy to half-normal as per Stan
recommendations (Stan Development Team; http://mc-stan.org/)
rew reward, pun punishment, reinf. reinforcement, loc location, stim stimulus
Table 3 Comparison of model performance
Rank Name Parameters Log marginal likelihood Log posterior P (model)
7 Model 1 αreinf, τreinf −16984.66 −503.8250
3 Model 2 αreinf, τreinf, τstim −16687.72 −206.8821
6 Model 3 αrew, αpun, τreinf −16835.28 −354.4418
4 Model 4a αrew, αpun, τreinf, τloc −16732.50 −251.6656
2 Model 4b αrew, αpun, τreinf, τstim −16585.12 −104.2815
1 Model 4c αrew, αpun, τreinf, τloc, τstim −16480.83 0.0000
5 Model 5 ρ, φ, β −16821.35 −340.5171
Models are listed in order of increasing complexity and nestedness. Model ranked 1st was the winning model. Model names and parameters correspond
to Table 2. The log marginal likelihood and log posterior P (model) are comparison metrics used to determine the best model. A numerically larger, i.e.
less negative, log marginal likelihood is better. The prior probabilities of all models were equal
rew reward, pun punishment, reinf. reinforcement, loc location, stim stimulus
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the entire family of those to be considered (Table 3). We as-
sumed that all models had equal prior probability.
Interpretation of results
In addition to the estimated parameters, comparisons of inter-
est (e.g. between groups on placebo; between-group differ-
ences in the effects of each drug) were also sampled directly
to give a posterior probability distribution for each quantity of
interest. Posterior distributions were interpreted using the 95%
highest posterior density interval (HDI), the Bayesian “credi-
ble interval”. Multiple comparisons correction procedures
(which would be appropriate for a null-hypothesis signifi-
cance testing approach) were not applied, since Bayesian hi-
erarchical models intrinsically make comparisons more con-
servative through “shrinkage” of estimates drawn from a
higher-level distribution (including, at the least, the priors at
the top level), leading to an automatic multiple comparisons
correction without the reduction in power seen with the clas-
sical approach (Gelman and Tuerlinckx 2000; Gelman et al.
2012; Kruschke 2011b).
We note in particular the following properties of the
Bayesian modelling approach with respect to testing for group
and drug effects. Firstly, identical priors were used for all
group and drug conditions. Secondly, it is possible to examine
group or drug differences via parameter estimation (e.g. cal-
culating a posterior distribution on a group-difference param-
eter, and examining whether this plausibly includes zero) or
model comparison (e.g. comparing a model that accounts for
possible group differences with one that does not—compare
Mkrtchian et al. (2017) for a related non-Bayesian approach
from this perspective). Both approaches are superior to null
hypothesis significant testing (Kruschke 2011b); however, the
parameter estimation procedure is in general preferable to the
model comparison approach (Kruschke 2011a, b). Allowing a
model to measure a group difference does not bias the analysis
to yield a nonzero group difference if there is none in the data
(though, obviously, a model that does not represent “group” in
its structure can never detect a group difference). Accordingly,
we used the samemodel structure for group/drug comparisons
throughout, and varied the model structure only for the RL
aspects. Thirdly, a Bayesian analysis of a two-factor (e.g.
group × drug) factorial design (Kruschke 2011b; Gelman
et al. 2013) can be analysed in two equivalent ways: (a) with
predictors corresponding to the traditional coding of an
ANOVA design matrix [intercept, group effect(s), drug ef-
fect(s), interaction effect(s)], whose coefficient-weighted
combination determines the expected value for a cell, or (b)
a “cell means” approach with the mean for each factor com-
bination (each cell) estimated directly (e.g. control/placebo
mean, control/amisulpride mean, OCD/placebo mean, etc.).
These methods are equivalent (and have identical numbers
of parameters). We chose the latter as this makes obtaining
posterior distributions for drug/group effects simpler; it also
improves the computational implementation, as parameter
range constraints can be directly specified and the Monte
Carlo process can be allowed to explore distributions that
are less interdependent. Fourthly, in all cases it is critical that
the model design correctly captures the correlation structure of
the data, such as the within-subjects structure.
Simulation of behavioural data from winning model
To establish if the winning model was sufficient to reproduce
key behavioural phenomena, we simulated behavioural data
from the winning model, and analysed it as per Ersche et al.
(2011). For each group (healthy controls, SUD, OCD) and
drug (placebo, amisulpride, pramipexole) combination, we
simulated 100 identical virtual “subjects” using the posterior
group mean parameters from the winning model. Each “sub-
ject” performed the probabilistic reversal learning task in
silico. We did not simulate inter-subject parameter variability
(or, therefore, a within-subjects structure), because the pur-
pose of this analysis is to use arbitrarily high power to estab-
lish the model’s sufficiency to reproduce known behavioural
patterns. For a given group/drug combination, variability in
the decisions made by each virtual subject is a consequence
only of the random process via which choice probabilities are
mapped to concrete choices, and the random assignment of
stimuli to left/right sides. Source code is presented in the
Supplementary Material, as is a full description of the simu-
lated task.
To demonstrate the necessity (as well as the sufficiency) of
changes in stickiness parameters to explain key behavioural
effects, we conducted two further simulations. The first addi-
tional simulation fixed the location stickiness parameter, τloc,
so that it did not vary between groups or drugs. The simulation
was performed exactly as above except that for all “subjects”
in all drug conditions, τlocwas set to its overall posterior mean
(taken, for simplicity, as the mean of the 3 × 3 per-group/per-
drug posterior mean parameters). The second additional sim-
ulation did the same but fixed τstim instead, likewise.
Results
Baseline characteristics
Whilst participants did not have any other Axis I psychiatric
diagnosis at the time of the study, the groups differed in their
depression scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II;
Beck et al. 1996; F(2,50) = 19.782, p < 0.001). Both the SUD
and OCD groups had significantly greater depression scores
than controls (t(18) = − 3.759, p = 0.001 for SUD; t(18) = −
5.960, p < 0.001 for OCD). Depression scores in the OCD
group were also significantly greater than in the SUD group
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(t(28) = − 3.068, p = 0.005). Other baseline characteristics on
the three groups of participants are presented in Table 1.
Choice of model
A simple computational model of reinforcement learning best
described behaviour. Conventional analyses of PRL assess
sensitivity to immediate reinforcement (Murphy et al. 2003;
Ersche et al. 2011) and do not account for the possibility that
choice behaviour is influenced by an integration of feedback
history from multiple experiences (Rygula et al. 2015). To
assess the computations underlying task performance, beyond
the influence of immediate feedback, we fitted and compared
seven reinforcement learning models (Table 2). Convergence
was not perfect, with a maximum R^ = 1.478, but was good,
with > 99% of parameters and contrasts having R^ < 1.1.
Moreover, all parameters of interest (all group-level mean
and distributional parameters and all contrasts) had R^ <
1.121. The winning model, as determined using a bridge sam-
pling estimate of the marginal likelihood (Table 3), included
five parameters: (1) positive reinforcement rate, the extent to
which behaviour is driven by learning from positive feedback;
(2) negative reinforcement rate, or learning from negative
feedback; (3) reinforcement sensitivity, which is the overall
sensitivity to reinforced stimulus value; (4) “stimulus sticki-
ness”, the tendency to repeat choices to recently chosen stim-
uli, regardless of outcome; and (5) “side (location) stickiness”,
the degree to which participants responded to, or got “stuck”
to, the same side (location) of the computer screen as before,
left or right, irrespective of stimulus or outcome. The sticki-
ness parameters, it is worth noting, can be comparable to strat-
egies of exploration versus exploitation (Clarke et al. 2014;
Seymour et al. 2012) and may relate to conventional measures
of perseveration. The winning model demonstrated parameter
recovery from simulated data (see Supplementary Material).
All results are summarised in Tables 3, 4 and 5 and in Figs. 3,
4 and 5.
Simulation of behavioural data from winning model
The winning model reproduced key behavioural phenomena
found by Ersche et al. (2011). In line with their results, our
analysis of simulated data revealed a main effect of group for
the number of trials per sequence (F(2,297) = 97.477, p =
2.84 × 10−33). The SUD group required more trials per se-
quence to reach criterion compared to both the healthy control
group (t(195) = − 8.792, p = 7.62 × 10−16) and the OCD group
(t(187) = − 13.638, p = 7.36 × 10−30). The groups also differed
in the number of spontaneous errors (F(2,297) = 394.392, p =
2.49 × 10−84), with the SUD group making more spontaneous
errors than both controls (t(168) = − 21.028, p = 5.80 × 10−49)
and the OCD group (t(148) = − 23.446, p = 1.0504 × 10−51).
There was a main effect of group, absent in Ersche et al.
(2011), for the number of probabilistic switches (F(2,297) =
26.896, p = 1.84 × 10−11). Both the SUD (t(198) = − 4.302,
p = 2.7 × 10−5) and OCD groups (t(198) = − 7.343, p = 5.31 ×
10−12) showed greater probabilistic switching compared to
controls, and the OCD group demonstrated more probabilistic
switching than the SUD group (t(198) = − 3.032, p = 0.003).
We observed a main effect of perseverative error rate
(F(2,297) = 36.101, p = 9.24 × 10
−15). While this main effect
was absent in Ersche et al. (2011), our follow up t tests are
in line with their post hoc analysis: The perseverative error
rate was greater in SUD compared to controls (t(183) = − 2.385,
p = 0.018), was greater in SUD compared to OCD (t(173) =
7.967, p = 2.10 × 10−13), and was greater in healthy controls
than in OCD (t(198) = 6.611, p = 3.46 × 10
−10).
Table 4 Between-group effects on parameters from the winning model
SUD vs HC OCD vs HC SUD vs
OCD
Parameter Placebo Effects of
amisulpride
Effects of
pramipexole
Placebo Effects of
amisulpride
Effects of
pramipexole
Placebo
Reward learning rate, αrew ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
Punishment learning rate,
αpun
↑ ↓ ↑
Reinforcement sensitivity,
τreinf
↓ ↓
Location (side) stickness,
τloc
↓ ↓ ↑
Stimulus stickness, τstim ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
HC healthy controls. Contrasts shown are (left to right) SUD_placebo – HC_placebo; [(SUD_drug – SUD_placebo) – (HC_drug – HC_placebo)] for
amisulpride, and separately for pramipexole; OCD_placebo –HC_placebo; [(OCD_drug –OCD_placebo) – (HC_drug –HC_placebo)] for amisulpride,
and separately for pramipexole; SUD_placebo –OCD_placebo. These results correspond to Figs. 3 and 5a, b. Arrows denote an increase or decrease of a
parameter in a given contrast. Lack of an arrow indicates no difference
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Next, we assessed drug effects in our simulated data, again
using the same analyses as reported in Ersche et al. (2011).
There was a significant effect of drug on number of trials per
sequence (F(2,891) = 6.603, p = 0.001), and there was also a
drug-by-group interaction (F(4,891) = 6.234, p = 6 × 10
−5). For
spontaneous errors, there was also a main effect of drug
(F(2,891) = 33.939, p = 6.24 × 10
−15) and a drug-by-group in-
teraction (F(4,891) = 22.624, p = 8.09 × 10
−18). There was a
main effect of drug on probabilistic switches as well
(F(2,891) = 10.802, p = 2.3 × 10
−5). As in Ersche et al. (2011),
there was no drug-by-group interaction (F(4,891) = 1.630, p =
0.165) for probabilistic switches. We found a drug-by-group
interaction on the perseverative error rate (F(4,891) = 3.377,
p = 0.009), in line with Ersche et al. (2011). Post hoc analyses
on the perseverative error rate revealed a main effect of group
for amisulpride (F(2,297) = 14.939, p = 6.58 × 10
−7) and for
pramipexole (F(2,297) = 20.347, p = 5.23 × 10
−9). In contrast
to Ersche et al. (2011), pramipexole was not associated with
a change in the perseverative error rate compared to placebo,
in SUD (t(198) = − 0.071, p = 0.944). The difference in the per-
severative error rate in the SUD group and healthy controls
persisted when on pramipexole (t(178) = − 3.933, p = 1.20 ×
10−4). Consistent with Ersche et al. (2011), there was no
change in the perseverative error rate on pramipexole relative
to placebo in healthy controls (t(198) = 1.912, p = 0.057) or in
the OCD group (t(198) = − 0.980, p = 0.328). Amisulpride, in
line with Ersche et al. (2011), did not significantly alter the
perseverative error rate compared to placebo in the healthy
control (t(198) = − 1.147, p = 0.253), SUD (t(198) = 1.618, p =
0.107), or OCD (t(190) = − 1.876, p = 0.062) groups.
Simulation with fixed value for stimulus stickiness
Next, we analysed simulated data generated with a fixed value
for the stimulus stickiness parameter, to determine the whether
variation in this parameter was necessary to optimally capture
the key behavioural phenomena from Ersche et al. (2011).
Whilst on placebo, the main effects of group persisted for
the number of trials per sequence (F(2,297) = 88.209, p =
8.52 × 10−31) and spontaneous errors (F(2,297) = 911.582, p =
1.73 × 10−127). The SUD group still required a greater number
of trials per sequence than the healthy controls (t(198) = −
10.195, p = 6.91 × 10−20) and the OCD group (t(198) = −
12.182, p = 7.66 × 10−26), and this was also true for
Table 5 Within-group drug effects on parameters from the winning model
HC SUD OCD
Parameter Amisulpride Pramipexole Amisulpride Pramipexole Amisulpride Pramipexole
Reward learning rate, αrew ↑ ↑
Punishment learning rate, αpun ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
Reinforcement sensitivity, τreinf ↓ ↓ ↓
Location (side) stickness, τloc ↓ ↓
Stimulus stickness, τstim ↓
All effects are comparisons between drug and placebo within a group. HC healthy controls.Within group comparisons: HC_amisulpride –HC_ placebo;
HC_pramipexole – HC_placebo; likewise for SUD and OCD. These results correspond to Fig. 4a–c. Arrows denote an increase or decrease of a
parameter in a given contrast. Lack of an arrow indicates no difference
Stimulus stickiness: SUD − OCD
Stimulus stickiness: SUD − HC
Stimulus stickiness: OCD − HC
Side stickiness: SUD − OCD
Side stickiness: SUD − HC
Side stickiness: OCD − HC
Reinf. sensitivity: SUD − OCD
Reinf. sensitivity: SUD − HC
Reinf. sensitivity: OCD − HC
Punishment rate: SUD − OCD
Punishment rate: SUD − HC
Punishment rate: OCD − HC
Reward rate: SUD − OCD
Reward rate: SUD − HC
Reward rate: OCD − HC
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2
mean /95% HDI
Group differences on placebo
90
Fig. 3 Differences between groups on placebo. Reinf. reinforcement, HC
healthy controls. The optimal computational model contained parameters
measuring (from top to bottom) learning from positive feedback, learning
from negative feedback, sensitivity to reinforcement, a tendency to repeat
choices on a recently chosen side (side stickiness), and a tendency to
repeat choices to a recently chosen stimulus (stimulus stickiness).
Differences in parameter per-group means under placebo; posterior 0 ∉
95% HDI signified in red
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spontaneous errors: there were more spontaneous errors in
SUD compared to controls (t(178) = − 31.738, p = 3.09 ×
10−75) and relative to the OCD group (t(157) = − 36.893, p =
2.34 × 10−79). There was a main effect of group on probabi-
listic switches (F(2,297) = 39.424, p = 6.53 × 10
−16), which was
absent in Ersche et al. (2011), but present in the prior simula-
tion analysis which incorporated variation in stimulus sticki-
ness parameter. The pattern of effects, however, changed. In
the standard simulation analysis, above, the OCD group
showed the most probabilistic switches, followed by the
SUD group. When fixing the stimulus stickiness parameter
value, however, the SUD group now displayed the most prob-
abilistic switching. There were more probabilistic switches in
the SUD group compared to controls (t(198) = − 8.336, p =
1.28 × 10−14) and in SUD compared to the OCD group
(t(198) = − 6.654, p = 2.73 × 10−10). Probabilistic switches in
the OCD group, at the same time, were no longer significantly
greater than controls (t(198) = − 1.705, p = 0.09), which had
been the case when incorporating variation in the stimulus
stickiness parameter. Critically, the main effect of group on
the perseverative error rate, in simulated data generated with-
out variation in the stimulus stickiness parameter, was
completely abolished (F(2,297) = 0.546, p = 0.58). This finding
on the perseverative error rate underlines the importance and
centrality of the stimulus stickiness parameter in our model.
Critically, by fixing the value of the stimulus stickiness
parameter, there was no main effect of drug (F(2,897) = 0.004,
p = 0.996), nor was there a drug-by-group interaction
(F(4,891) = 2.322, p = 0.055) on the perseverative error rate.
The main findings of Ersche et al. (2011) hinged on
the presence of this interaction. We therefore underline the
importance of variation in the stimulus stickiness parameter
Stimulus stickiness: pramipexole
Stimulus stickiness: amisulpr ide
Side stickiness: pramipexole
Side stickiness: amisulpr ide
Reinf. sensitivity: pramipexole
Reinf. sensitivity: amisulpr ide
Punishment rate: pramipexole
Punishment rate: amisulpride
Reward rate: pramipexole
Reward rate: amisulpride
−1.0 −0.5 0.0
mean 90/95% HDI
Drug effects (versus placebo) in HC group
Stimulus stickiness: pramipexole
Stimulus stickiness: amisulpr ide
Side stickiness: pramipexole
Side stickiness: amisulpr ide
Reinf. sensitivity: pramipexole
Reinf. sensitivity: amisulpr ide
Punishment rate: pramipexole
Punishment rate: amisulpride
Reward rate: pramipexole
Reward rate: amisulpride
−2 1 0 1
mean 90/95% HDI
Drug effects (versus placebo) in SUD group
Stimulus stickiness: pramipexole
Stimulus stickiness: amisulpr ide
Side stickiness: pramipexole
Side stickiness: amisulpr ide
Reinf. sensitivity: pramipexole
Reinf. sensitivity: amisulpr ide
Punishment rate: pramipexole
Punishment rate: amisulpride
Reward rate: pramipexole
Reward rate: amisulpride
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5
mean 90/95% HDI
Drug effects (versus placebo) in OCD group
a
b
c
Fig. 4 Effects of amisulpride and
pramipexole (relative to placebo)
in each group. Reinf.
reinforcement, HC healthy
controls. a Difference in
parameter per-condition means
between HC on amisulpride or
pramipexole compared to HC on
placebo; posterior 0 ∉ 95% HDI
signified in red, 0 ∉ 90% HDI in
orange; HC_drug – HC_placebo.
b Difference in parameter per-
condition means between SUD
under amisulpride or pramipexole
compared to SUD on placebo,
posterior 0 ∉ 95% HDI; SUD_
drug – SUD_placebo. c
Difference in parameter per-
condition means between OCD
on amisulpride or pramipexole
compared to OCD on placebo,
posterior 0 ∉ 95% HDI; OCD_
drug – OCD_placebo
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in our model, by showing it is necessary to reproduce key
patterns of effects on behaviour in relation to drug and disease,
seen in the original data.
Simulation with fixed value for side stickiness
We then analysed simulated data generated instead with a
fixed value for the side (location) stickiness parameter, with
variation in the stimulus stickiness parameter. In contrast to
the importance of variation in the stimulus stickiness parame-
ter to capture an effect of group on the perseverative error rate,
a fixed value of the side stickiness parameter still produced a
highly significant effect of group on the perseverative error
rate under placebo (F(2,297) = 28.519, p = 4.68 × 10
−12). The
SUD group had a higher perseverative error rate than both
the healthy controls (t(171) = − 4.145, p = 5.3 × 10−5) and the
OCD group (t(198) = − 6.977, p = 4.43 × 10−11). Controls addi-
tionally had a greater perseverative error rate than the OCD
group (t(198) = 3.692, p = 2.87 × 10
−4). The three other key be-
havioural patterns could also be captured despite a fixed value
for the side (location) stickiness parameter: number of trials
per sequence (F(2,297) = 147.069, p = 4.06 × 10
−45) and spon-
taneous errors (F(2,297) = 484.526, p = 3.09 × 10
−94)—both
consistent with Ersche et al. (2011)—as well as probabilistic
switches (F(2,297) = 27.327, p = 1.28 × 10
−11). In line with
Ersche et al. (2011), the SUD group required more trials per
sequence than both the healthy controls (t(191) = − 12.046, p =
3.19 × 10−25), and the OCD group (t(187) = − 15.925, p =
1.26 × 10−36), and the same pattern was observed for sponta-
neous errors: the SUD group made more spontaneous errors
than the healthy controls (t(170) = − 24.657, p = 4.30 × 10−58)
and the OCD group (t(169) = − 25.448, p = 1.02 × 10−59).
Pairwise comparisons on the number of probabilistic switches
produced the same pattern of results as in our first simulation
analysis, where neither stimulus nor side stickiness were fixed
values: Both the SUD (t(198) = − 4.861, p = 2 × 10−6) and OCD
groups (t(183) = − 7.484, p = 2.93 × 10−12) showed greater
probabilistic switching compared to controls, and the OCD
group demonstrated more probabilistic switching than the
SUD group (t(198) = 2.547, p = 0.012).
Critically, by holding constant the value of the side
(location) stickiness parameter, there was no main effect of
drug (F(2,897) = 0.937, p = 0.392), nor was there a drug-by-
group interaction on the perseverative error rate (F(4,891) =
2.047, p = 0.086), demonstrating the importance of variation
in this model parameter.
Pramipexole: stimulus stickiness
Pramipexole: side stickiness
Pramipexole: reinf. sensitivity
Pramipexole: punishment rate
Pramipexole: reward rate
Amisulpride: stimulus stickiness
Amisulpride: side stickiness
Amisulpride: reinf. sensitivity
Amisulpride: punishment rate
Amisulpride: reward rate
−2 −1 0 1
mean 90/95% HDI
Group differences in drug effects: SUD − HC
Pramipexole: stimulus stickiness
Pramipexole: side stickiness
Pramipexole: reinf. sensitivity
Pramipexole: punishment rate
Pramipexole: reward rate
Amisulpride: stimulus stickiness
Amisulpride: side stickiness
Amisulpride: reinf. sensitivity
Amisulpride: punishment rate
Amisulpride: reward rate
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
mean 90/95% HDI
Group differences in drug effects: OCD − HC
a
b
Fig. 5 Differences in the effects
of amisulpride or pramipexole
between patient groups and
healthy controls. All contrasts
represent the difference between
drug X’s effect in the patient
group and its effect in the control
group. Reinf. reinforcement, HC
healthy controls. a [(SUD_drug –
SUD_placebo) – (HC_drug –
HC_placebo)] for amisulpride,
and separately for pramipexole;
posterior 0 ∉ 95% HDI signified
in red, 0 ∉ 90% HDI in orange. b)
Posterior 0 ∈ 95%HDI denoted in
black, indicating no differences.
This was a subtraction of [(OCD_
drug – OCD_placebo) – (HC_
drug – HC_placebo)] for
amisulpride, and separately for
pramipexole
2348 Psychopharmacology (2019) 236:2337–2358
Stimulus stickiness
Our first novel result was that the stimulus stickiness param-
eter differentiated SUD and OCD. Stimulus stickiness as-
sesses stimulus-bound behaviour, a measure of the degree to
which choices were driven by the stimulus that was selected in
the recent past, irrespective of outcome. Under placebo, indi-
viduals with SUD showed significantly increased stimulus
stickiness relative to healthy controls (difference in parameter
per-group mean, posterior 95% highest posterior density in-
terval (HDI) excluding zero), whereas people with OCD
showed decreased stimulus stickiness relative to controls
(group difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI); see Table 4 and Fig. 3.
Effects of dopaminergic agents on stimulus stickiness
Amisulpride ameliorated the elevated stimulus stickiness in
SUD: there was improvement both compared to their perfor-
mance on placebo (drug difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 4b;
Table 5), and relative to the effects of amisulpride on healthy
controls (group difference in drug effect, 0 ∉ 95% HDI;
Fig. 5a; Table 4). Stimulus stickiness in OCD, on the other
hand, was unaffected: amisulpride did not have a different
effect on stimulus stickiness in OCD relative to their perfor-
mance on placebo (no drug difference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 4c;
Table 5) nor when compared to the effect of amisulpride on
healthy controls (no group difference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 5b;
Table 4). Pramipexole had no effect on stimulus stickiness in
SUD or OCD (no differences 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Figs. 4b, c and
5a, b; Tables 4 and 5). Stimulus stickiness in healthy controls
was unaffected by either drug (no drug differences, 0 ∈ 95%
HDI; Fig. 4a; Table 5).
Side (location) stickiness
We also evaluated another type of stickiness: side stickiness,
or the tendency to repeat choices to the same side (location) of
the computer screen as before, regardless of stimulus type or
outcome. Side (location) stickiness was greater in SUD com-
pared to OCD (group difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 3;
Table 4), and dopaminergic agents modulated this parameter
in SUD only. Individuals with OCD, on placebo, showed no
impairment of side stickiness relative to healthy controls (no
group difference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 3; Table 4). Both
amisulpride and pramipexole reduced side stickiness in indi-
viduals with SUD compared to their performance on placebo
(drug differences, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 4b; Table 5). When
comparing drug effects in SUD to those in controls,
amisulpride reduced side stickiness more in SUD than in con-
trols (group difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 5a; Table 4), but
pramipexole did not have a differential effect (no group dif-
ference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 5a; Table 4). In the OCD group,
side stickiness was unaffected by either amisulpride or
pramipexole compared to placebo (no drug differences, 0 ∈
95% HDI; Fig. 4c; Table 5). Amisulpride and pramipexole,
additionally, did not differentially affect side stickiness in the
OCD group relative to healthy controls (no group differences,
0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 5b; Table 4).
Reward-driven learning
We measured the rate at which participants learned from pos-
itive feedback in the task. Reward-driven learning was im-
paired in SUD and not in OCD: on placebo, individuals with
SUD showed diminished learning from positive feedback rel-
ative to controls (group difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 3;
Table 4), while the OCD group was no different from healthy
controls in their reward learning (no group difference, 0 ∈
95% HDI; Fig. 3; Table 4). Reward learning in SUD was
sensitive to dopaminergic agents: Both amisulpride and
pramipexole remediated the diminished reward learning seen
under placebo, increasing reward-driven learning (drug differ-
ences, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 4b; Table 5). This was also the case
when comparing the effects of the dopaminergic agents on
reward-driven learning in SUD versus healthy controls (group
differences, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 5a; Table 4). Neither
amisulpride nor pramipexole, meanwhile, altered reward-
driven learning in individuals with OCD, both when com-
pared to these drugs’ effects in controls (no group differences,
0 ∈ 95%HDI; Fig. 5b; Table 4) and when contrasted with their
own performance on placebo (no drug differences, 0 ∈ 95%
HDI; Fig. 4c; Table 5). Reward learning in controls was unaf-
fected by amisulpride and pramipexole, compared to placebo
(no drug differences, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 4a; Table 5).
Punishment-driven learning
Both individuals with SUD and with OCD showed increased
learning from negative feedback (punishment in the form of
nonreward) on placebo, compared to healthy controls (group
differences, 0 ∉ 95%HDI; Fig. 3; Table 4). In individuals with
SUD, pramipexole led to a small improvement in their elevat-
ed negative feedback learning relative to placebo (drug differ-
ence, 0 ∉ 90% HDI; Fig. 4b; Table 5). Amisulpride, on the
other hand, neither worsened nor corrected the elevated neg-
ative feedback-driven learning seen on placebo (no drug dif-
ference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 4b; Table 5). Relative to their
baseline performance on placebo, the OCD group showed a
further increase in learning from negative feedback on both
amisulpride and pramipexole (drug differences, 0 ∉ 95%HDI;
Fig. 4c; Table 5). The negative feedback learning rate was the
only parameter in the model that was modulated in healthy
controls by dopaminergic agents. The control group showed
an increase in learning from negative feedback on amisulpride
(drug difference, 0 ∉ 90% HDI; Fig. 4a; Table 5) and more so
under pramipexole (drug difference, 0 ∉ 95% HDI; Fig. 4a;
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Table 5). Amisulpride and pramipexole, in fact, increased neg-
ative feedback-driven learning in OCD and healthy controls to
the same extent (no group differences, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 5b;
Table 4). Dopaminergic agents differentially affected negative
feedback learning in SUD when contrasted with healthy con-
trols: the SUD group showed a relative decrease in this pa-
rameter on amisulpride (group difference, 0 ∉ 90% HDI; Fig.
5a; Table 4) and pramipexole (group difference, 0 ∉ 95%HDI;
Fig. 5a; Table 4), driven in part by the drug-induced elevated
negative feedback learning rate in controls.
Reinforcement sensitivity
Reinforcement sensitivity, the overall sensitivity to reinforced
stimulus value, was unimpaired in SUD and OCD at baseline
but was compromised by dopaminergic agents. Results on this
parameter were not different between the OCD, SUD, or
healthy control groups under placebo (no group differences,
0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 3; Table 4). There were, however, drug-
induced effects. Reinforcement sensitivity in individuals with
SUD was most impaired by dopaminergic modulation. Both
amisulpride and pramipexole reduced reinforcement sensitiv-
ity in SUD, relative to placebo (group differences, 0 ∉ 95%
HDI; Fig. 4b; Table 5). Amisulpride and pramipexole also
reduced reinforcement sensitivity in SUD when compared to
the drug effects on healthy controls (drug differences, 0 ∉ 95%
HDI; Fig. 5a; Table 4). In the OCD group, amisulpride in-
duced a deficit compared to placebo (drug difference, 0 ∉
95% HDI; Fig. 4c; Table 5), whereas pramipexole had no
effect (no drug difference, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 4c; Table 5).
Amisulpride and pramipexole did not differentially affect re-
inforcement sensitivity in the OCD group compared to con-
trols (no group differences, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 5b; Table 4).
Finally, neither amisulpride nor pramipexole induced an im-
pairment of reinforcement sensitivity in healthy controls com-
pared to placebo (no drug differences, 0 ∈ 95% HDI; Fig. 4a,
Table 5).
Correlations with conventional behavioural measures
We next tested to see how the parameters in our winning
model related to the conventional measures of behaviour
(see “Methods”) from Ersche et al. (2011). Because stimulus
stickiness is a measure of stimulus-bound perseveration, we
asked whether stimulus stickiness was correlated with either
conventional measure of perseveration in Ersche et al. (2011),
which was their primary focus. We found that in healthy con-
trols on placebo, stimulus stickiness was significantly posi-
tively correlated with the number of perseverative errors
(r = 0.587, p = 0.01, uncorrected) and the perseverative error
rate (r = 0.672, p = 0.002, uncorrected). In SUD and OCD on
placebo, however, stimulus stickiness was not correlated with
the perseverative error rate or the number of perseverative
errors (all p > 0.05). Under amisulpride or pramipexole, more-
over, neither the perseverative error rate nor the number of
perseverative errors correlated with stimulus stickiness in the
healthy control, SUD, or OCD groups (all p > 0.05).
Side stickiness was not correlated with either measure of
perseveration under placebo in the healthy control, SUD, or
OCD groups (all p > 0.05). There were also no significant
correlations between side stickiness and the two measures of
perseveration in the SUD or OCD groups on either
amisulpride or pramipexole (all p > 0.05). In healthy controls
on amisulpride there was a significant correlation between
side stickiness and the number of perseverative errors (r =
0.773, p = 1.69 × 10−4, uncorrected), and the perseverative er-
ror rate (r = 0.473, p = 0.048, uncorrected). On pramipexole,
side stickiness was also correlated in healthy controls with the
number of perseverative errors (r = 0.499, p = 0.035,
uncorrected).
We also asked whether the diminished reward learning rate
we observed in SUD on placebo was related to the increase in
spontaneous errors reported in Ersche et al. (2011)—in other
words a decrease in staying with the correct choice despite
having received a reward (decreased win-stay). Indeed, a de-
creased reward rate was correlated with a greater number of
spontaneous errors in SUD on placebo (r = − 0.752, p =
4.92 × 10−4, uncorrected). We then asked whether an in-
creased punishment learning rate was related to increased
probabilistic switches in Ersche et al. (2011)—increased
switching to the incorrect choice following misleading nega-
tive feedback, i.e. lose-shift behaviour. This was indeed the
case for all three groups: a greater punishment learning rate
was correlated with more probabilistic switches in healthy
controls (r = 0.748, p = 3.58 × 10−4, uncorrected), SUD (r =
0.815, p = 6.7 × 10−5, uncorrected), and OCD (r = 0.858, p =
5 × 10−6, uncorrected). Further correlations between the mod-
el parameters and conventional behavioural measures are pre-
sented in the Supplementary Material.
Pairwise tests of probabilistic switches
Because Ersche et al. (2011) did not find a main effect of
group on probabilistic switching (lose-shift) behaviour they
did not report pairwise comparisons between the groups. We
realised conducting these comparisons would be important for
multiple reasons: It would enable us to (1) compare the orig-
inal SUD data from Ersche et al. (2011) to PRL in alcohol use
disorder (AUD) from Reiter et al. (2016) who compared only
two groups; (2) compare the original SUD data to the results
from our simulation analysis; (3) compare the original OCD
data to that of Hauser et al. (2017), who also only compared
two groups; and (4) to understand how the original findings in
the healthy control, SUD, and OCD groups relate to parame-
ters such as the punishment learning rate (see Table 4 in the
Supplementary Materials). The SUD group showed more
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probabilistic switching (lose-shift) behaviour compared to
healthy controls (t(33) = − 2.119, p = 0.042). This effect was
also marginally significant in the OCD group compared to
controls: increased probabilistic switching (t(23) = − 2.054,
p = 0.051). There was no difference between the OCD and
SUD groups (t(27) = − 0.606, p = 0.549).
Correlations with questionnaire measures
We tested whether stimulus-bound behaviour—stimulus
stickiness—as measured under placebo, was correlated with
severity of compulsive symptoms as assessed through ques-
tionnaires. Scores on the Obsessive Compulsive Drug Use
Scale (OCDUS; Franken et al. 2002) in the SUD group were
not correlated with their stimulus stickiness results (r = −
0.028, p = 0.914). There was also no significant correlation
between stimulus stickiness in the OCD group and their scores
on the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS,
Goodman et al. 1989; r = − 0.395, p = 0.105). We also tested
whether stimulus stickiness in SUD was correlated with years
of drug use, which would suggest a drug-induced effect; this
correlation, however, was not significant (r = − 0.177, p =
496). Because the SUD, OCD, and control groups differed
in their depression scores on the BDI-II, we also tested wheth-
er this was correlated with stimulus stickiness results on pla-
cebo. Depression scores were not correlated with stimulus
stickiness in SUD (r = − 0.163, p = 0.531), OCD (r = 0.415,
p = 0.087), or healthy controls (r = − 0.080, p = 0.754).
Discussion
The aim of our study was to uncover the microstructure of
behaviour, and its dopaminergic modulation, in SUD and
OCD using RL models. We found that the computational pro-
file of PRL performance differed between SUD, OCD, and
healthy controls, and both dopaminergic drugs tested modu-
lated behavioural parameters in all three groups (Figs. 3, 4 and
5; Tables 4 and 5), which considerably extends the conven-
tional analyses of Ersche et al. (2011). One key result was in
regard to stimulus stickiness, which measures a basic persev-
erative tendency. This one measure differentiated all three
groups: individuals with SUD demonstrated increased stimu-
lus stickiness while the OCD group displayed a decrease rel-
ative to controls (Fig. 3). The former result is consistent with
Ersche et al. (2011) who showed a perseverative impairment
in SUD. The finding of the opposite change in OCD, mean-
while, demonstrates that the stimulus stickiness measure in
our model was able to detect subtleties of behaviour across
diagnostic categories which were not clearly delineated using
conventional methods. Interestingly, stimulus stickiness only
correlated with perseveration in our healthy control group,
suggesting that this measure is indeed related to perseveration,
yet also reinforcing the novelty of stimulus stickiness in
assessing these two disorders of compulsivity. This is in con-
sonance with Rygula et al. (2015) who studied PRL in mon-
keys with different serotonergic lesions: compared to controls
they found elevation of stimulus stickiness in one group, re-
duction in another, and perseveration in neither. A second
major set of findings related to basic changes in reward and
punishment (nonreward) learning occurring in the SUD and
OCD groups, not formalised in the earlier study. The SUD
group showed reduced reward learning, whilst both groups
demonstrated enhanced learning rates with punishment.
These parameters were also sensitive to dopaminergic drug
treatments and are discussed in detail below.
Computational modelling procedure
We used a fully Bayesian process for model comparison and
parameter estimation. The theoretically optimal method for
model comparison is to evaluate the probabilities of each
model, given the data; such a process incorporates Occam’s
razor correctly, penalizing over-complex models (Kruschke
2011a, b; MacKay 2003; Gronau et al. 2017a). Bridge sam-
pling (Gronau et al. 2017a, b) allows these probabilities to be
estimated directly, in combination with prior probabilities of
models; we assumed all models were equiprobable a priori. In
our study, this process eliminated simple reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms and selected a model incorporating reinforce-
ment learning with separate rates for reward and punishment
(nonreward), in addition to perseverative (“stickiness”) behav-
iour in respect both of the stimulus selected and the response
side (location). This model was superior to the EWA model,
which incorporates perseverative tendencies in a different
way. The model comparison process only selects amongst
the models offered for comparison; it is of course inevitable
that the true biological processes are more complex than our
winning model, and possible that a more complex model that
we did not consider was better. Nevertheless, simulations
demonstrated that the winning model was sufficient (and var-
iation in its stickiness parameters necessary) to capture the key
behavioural phenomena found in this dataset by Ersche et al.
(2011). Critically, group differences in perseveration were
completely abolished in simulated data generated without var-
iation in the stimulus stickiness parameter. Drug effects on
perseveration were additionally absent, which was also true
when holding the value of the side stickiness parameter con-
stant. The winning model therefore provides the following
interpretation of disease and drug effects in this task.
Dopaminergic modulation of stickiness parameters
We found that amisulpride, but not pramipexole, remediated
the elevated stimulus stickiness in SUD, whereas neither drug
modulated stimulus stickiness in OCD (Figs. 3, 4 and 5;
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Tables 4 and 5). This is in contrast to Ersche et al. (2011) who
found pramipexole remediated the perseverative deficit in
SUD, while their analysis did not detect an effect of
amisulpride on behaviour in any group. Both drugs, mean-
while, decreased side (location) stickiness in SUD. These var-
ied pharmacological results are in line with our observation
that stimulus stickiness, side (location) stickiness, and persev-
eration, were distinguishable, yet at times related. Parsing
these three conceptually similar measures helps refine the
way we study behavioural inflexibility. While the effects of
amisulpride and pramipexole on stickiness parameters and
perseveration are ostensibly paradoxical, D2/3 agonism and
antagonism have each produced deficits in reversal
learning—on a deterministic schedule in nonhuman
animals—and the results are multifaceted. D2/3 agonism and
antagonism, for instance, affected different aspects of reversal
learning (Boulougouris et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2007). D2/3
antagonism, additionally, when co-administered with a D2/3
agonist, protected against the deficit induced by the agonist,
and D2 and D3 receptors have been shown to play distinct
roles in reversal learning (Boulougouris et al. 2009).
Although pramipexole may have higher affinity for the D3
receptor (Camacho-Ochoa et al. 1995), the respective contri-
butions of D2 and D3 receptors cannot be dissected using less
selective drugs like amisulpride or pramipexole, as in our
study. It is also possible that autoreceptor activity, and the
doses used, contributed to the directionality of our effects—
notions that apply to all of our findings on dopaminergic mod-
ulation of computational parameters; Horst et al. (2018), for
example, have recently shown that the D2/3 agonist quinpirole
has triphasic effects on serial deterministic reversal leaning in
marmoset monkeys when infused into the caudate nucleus.
Performance was impaired at both low and high doses, and
improved at intermediate doses; the effects at low doses were
likely due to effects of presynaptic autoreceptors. Activation
of somato-dendritic autoreceptors versus striatal terminal do-
pamine autoreceptors, furthermore, may have different effects.
Evenden and Robbins (1983) additionally showed an impor-
tant pattern of results, which raise the notion of baseline-de-
pendency: d-amphetamine induced both response switching
and perseveration in the rat. Which behavioural pattern was
emitted depended not only on dose—perseveration generally
occurred at higher doses—and the task structure, but also on
baseline behaviour; the effects of d-amphetamine on behav-
iour were baseline-dependent. This notion of baseline depen-
dency likely applies to our observation of differential effects
of dopaminergic modulation in SUD and OCD; the disorders
share important baseline features including abnormal OFC
functional connectivity, though do not have an identical neural
profile (Meunier et al. 2012).
Understanding the nuances of D2/3 receptor involvement in
maladaptive behaviour is particularly important given the ev-
idence of reduced striatal D2 receptor availability in cocaine
abuse (Volkow et al. 1993), methamphetamine abuse (Volkow
et al. 2001), and OCD (Denys et al. 2004; Perani et al. 2008;
but see Schneier et al. 2008). An analogous pattern has been
observed in alcohol (Hietala et al. 1994; Volkow et al. 1996)
and opiate dependence (Wang et al. 1997). The studies of
cocaine and methamphetamine also tested orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) metabolism, showing an association between lower D2
receptor availability and reduced OFC metabolism (Volkow
et al. 1993, 2001). Behaviourally, monkeys with greater D2-
type availability indeed exhibited better performance on a
(deterministic) reversal learning task (Groman et al. 2011).
At the same time, healthy humans carrying the A1 allele of
the dopamine D2 receptor Taq1A polymorphism, which is
associated with reduced striatal D2 receptor expression,
showed deficits in PRL (Jocham et al. 2009).
Perseveration, checking behaviour, and uncertainty
Given SUD and OCD are both disorders of compulsivity and
perseveration can be an indicator of compulsivity, it is logical
to hypothesise that people with OCD would also show per-
severation in this task. Prior studies of OCD, however, have
not found evidence of perseveration during PRL
(Chamberlain et al. 2007a, b; Ersche et al. 2011; Hauser
et al. 2017; Remijnse et al. 2006). Compulsivity is indeed a
complex phenomenon and is difficult to capture in a single
measure. To that end, we have presented data that enrich our
understanding of the multifaceted nature of the construct.
Avoiding negative consequences is a key feature of OCD
(APA 2013) and is not as central in SUD. This may help
explain the divergent task findings in both the conventional
perseveration analysis in Ersche et al. (2011) and the compu-
tational analyses of stickiness parameters reported here. The
probabilistic nature of the task is likely of central importance.
The first component of PRL is to learn the optimal behaviour
in a stable environment, which requires ignoring rare negative
events by not switching choices. Because such probabilistic
switching was elevated in our OCD group, we thought it could
be related to diminished stimulus stickiness; however,
switching was also elevated in SUD. Probabilistic switching
(lose-shift), furthermore, was not correlated with stimulus (or
side/location) stickiness in SUD or OCD; instead, it was cor-
related with a higher learning rate for negative feedback in
healthy controls, SUD, and OCD, supporting the notion of
lose-shifting as a behavioural manifestation of hypersensitiv-
ity to negative feedback (Murphy et al. 2003; Taylor Tavares
et al. 2008). Moreover, findings from Hauser et al. (2017),
who also studied PRL in OCD, are in agreement with our
diminished stimulus stickiness result: using a different com-
putational model, individuals with OCD showed a decreased
likelihood of repeating the same action, regardless of stimulus
value. Hauser et al. (2017), interestingly, did not find elevated
probabilistic switching (lose-shift) in their OCD group. Our
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results in conjunction with Hauser et al. (2017) strengthen the
case that diminished stimulus stickiness provides a novel char-
acterization of PRL in OCD. The diminished stimulus sticki-
ness seen in OCD may be a manifestation of checking behav-
iour, a suggestion alsomade byHauser et al. (2017). Checking
behaviour, which can be a core symptom in OCD, was indeed
modulated by D2/3 agents in rats (Eagle et al. 2014), in a
translational laboratory model that has also captured increased
checking in OCD (Morein-Zamir et al. 2018). Uncertainty is a
feature common to both PRL and the translational model of
checking behaviour. When reinforcement is deterministic, as
opposed to probabilistic, there is less uncertainty and there is
no rare event to ignore. Deterministic reversal learning para-
digms may consequently be more sensitive to detect persev-
eration in OCD. Indeed, while serotonin depletion of the OFC
in marmosets induced perseveration on a deterministic rever-
sal learning paradigm (Clarke et al. 2004), which appears to
reflect behaviour that has become stimulus-bound (Walker
et al. 2009), OFC serotonin depletion also impaired PRL but
did not induce conventional perseveration (Rygula et al.
2015).
Reward- and punishment-driven learning
Our computational analysis showed diminished learning from
positive feedback in SUD, and an increase in learning from
negative feedback in both SUD and OCD (Fig. 3). These
results align with the original Ersche et al. (2011) data show-
ing diminished win-stay behaviour (more spontaneous errors)
in SUD and increased probabilistic switching (lose-shift) in
both SUD and OCD. Ersche et al. (2016), on the other hand,
found individuals with SUDwere impaired in both reward and
avoidance learning, a contrast likely due to several important
task differences. Ersche et al. (2016) measured avoidance of
electric shock, whereas our task included negative feedback in
the form of a sad red face icon, which is notably less salient
and presumably engenders less motivation. The appetitive
component of each study, however, was more similar in that
the positive feedback was given in the form of points or a
happy green face icon. Reinforcement, furthermore, was de-
terministic in the learning phase of the tasks used in Ersche
et al. (2016), which removes an element of uncertainty present
in probabilistic paradigms. Ersche et al. (2016) measured re-
ward and punishment learning in two separate tasks without
reversals, whereas our results here pertain to learning from
positive and negative feedback intertwined in the same
task—one affected the other. The salience of positive and
negative feedback in our task was matched, whereas the
salience of the aversive component of Ersche et al. (2016)
was greater than the appetitive component. It is possible that
the increased learning from negative feedback we observed in
SUD was a compensation for the decreased reward learning
and increased stimulus stickiness.
How do our learning rate findings in SUD relate to recent
data on PRL in alcohol use disorder (AUD)? Reiter et al.
(2016) found increased perseveration (albeit calculated differ-
ently) and diminished win-stay behaviour in AUD, both pres-
ent in SUD as reported by Ersche et al. (2011). Their model,
like ours, incorporated separate parameters for reward and
punishment (nonreward) rates for the chosen stimulus, but
they also included parameters for reward and punishment rates
that simultaneously tracked the value of the unchosen stimu-
lus. Of these, the only parameter that differed revealed an
AUD group deficit in updating the value of the alternative
(rewarded) option, following punishment (nonreward) on the
chosen stimulus. Whilst this would be interesting to test, it is
difficult to extrapolate to our data. At the same time, their lack
of an effect on learning rates for the chosen option differs from
our findings. We would have expected a diminished reward
learning rate in AUD to the chosen option, based on the
negative correlation between this parameter and spontane-
ous errors (increased win-shift) in SUD. Lose-shift behav-
iour seems to be a key source of divergence in the learning
rate results between the two studies: Reiter et al. (2016) did
not find a difference in lose-shift between AUD and con-
trols, whereas lose-shift was elevated in our SUD group
and correlated positively with the negative feedback learn-
ing rate. The lack of lose-shift behaviour in AUD at the
outset could be due to task discrepancies—the AUD study
used fewer reversals, for instance – or indeed a more gen-
eral difference in how participants with AUD and SUD
learn from negative feedback to guide behaviour in PRL
or outside the laboratory.
The increased learning from negative feedback we ob-
served in OCD, meanwhile, is consistent with Gillan et al.
(2014) who showed excessive avoidance of electric shock in
OCD. We found learning from positive feedback was not dif-
ferent between OCD and control participants, in line with
Gillan et al. (2011) who also showed no impairment in reward
learning, using a similar task to Ersche et al. (2016). Hauser
et al. (2017) reported no difference in learning from reinforce-
ment between healthy controls and OCD on PRL, however
their learning rate parameter did not measure positive and
negative feedback learning separately, as we report here.
Notably, their sample included adolescents with OCD as well
as adults, and the neuropsychological profile of OCD in these
age groups is not identical (Gottwald et al. 2018). In light of
Hauser et al. (2017), we tested a model with a single learning
rate and stimulus stickiness parameter (Table 2), and found it
ranked third best (Table 3), whereas our winning model was
not tested in their analysis. We additionally used a bridge
sampling estimate of the marginal likelihood to perform mod-
el comparison, which has been newly introduced to practical
Bayesian inference (Gronau et al. 2017a, b), and is thought to
be an improvement upon the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) as used in Hauser et al. (2017).
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Dopamine and reinforcement learning
Dopamine is well known for its central role in learning about
rewards. Nonhuman animal studies have shown that phasic
spiking of dopamine neurons signal positive outcomes that
are unexpected or more rewarding than anticipated, known
as positive prediction errors, whereas the omission of expect-
ed reward—negative prediction error—is associated with a
reduction of phasic dopaminergic firing (Schultz et al.
1997). Murray et al. (2019), compared the same set of OCD
and control participants as in our experiment and found that
negative prediction errors were enhanced in OCD and that this
was normalised by both amisulpride and pramipexole. Their
finding is not only consistent with the role of dopamine in
prediction error but also complements our observations that
amisulpride and pramipexole produced the same directionality
of effects on learning parameters.
In line with the role of dopamine in learning, amisulpride
and pramipexole reversed the deficit in learning from positive
feedback observed in SUD (Figs. 4b and 5a; Tables 4 and 5),
without affecting this parameter in OCD (Figs. 4c and 5b;
Tables 4 and 5) or healthy controls (Fig. 4a; Table 5).
Negative feedback-driven learning was increased in SUD at
baseline and was ameliorated by both drugs (Figs. 4b and 5a;
Tables 4 and 5). Both amisulpride and pramipexole increased
learning from negative feedback in OCD (Fig. 4c, Table 4)
and controls (Fig. 4a; Table 5), and this was the only drug-
induced change in healthy individuals detected by our model.
This series of results greatly extends the original findings, as
Ersche et al. (2011) found no drug effects on spontaneous
errors (win-shift) or probabilistic switches (lose-shift). These
correlated with the reward and punishment learning rates, re-
spectively, which we show here to be more sensitive to dopa-
minergic modulation.
Our results on learning rates in SUD in particular, and their
dopaminergic modulation, align with work on Parkinson’s
disease. Parkinson’s is characterised by dramatic degeneration
of dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra (Kish et al.
1988) and has therefore been of great importance for under-
standing dopamine function. SUD (cocaine use), at the same
time, is associated with lower levels of endogenous striatal
dopamine (Martinez et al. 2009). The mainstay of
Parkinson’s treatment is levodopa (L-DOPA), the biosynthetic
precursor to dopamine, and is thought to increase phasic do-
pamine release (Harden and Grace 1995; Pothos et al. 1998).
Rutledge et al. (2009) studied individuals with Parkinson’s on
and off of L-DOPA, using a dynamic foraging task with prob-
abilistic and reversal elements. They employed computational
modelling and showed L-DOPA increased learning rates to
rewards and remediated perseverative deficits. Both of these
findings are consistent with our results in SUD on reward
learning rates, stimulus stickiness, and their dopaminergic
modulation. The perseveration parameter in Rutledge et al.
(2009), like our stimulus stickiness measure, was independent
of reward history. Our results on positive and negative learn-
ing rates in SUD are also consistent with conventional analy-
ses by Frank et al. (2004): Individuals with Parkinson’s, when
off medication, were better at learning from negative feed-
back, as assessed by probabilistic and deterministic tasks with-
out reversals (Frank et al. 2004). When a reward is omitted,
there is ordinarily a dip in dopaminergic firing (Schultz et al.
1997), and in the setting of dopamine depletion in
Parkinson’s, this mechanism of learning from negative feed-
back appears to be facilitated, at least when assessed using
outcomes of points or money (Frank et al. 2004). On L-
DOPA reward learning was enhanced, consistent with
Rutledge et al. (2009), and the elevated learning from negative
feedback was normalised (Frank et al. 2004).
Eisenegger et al. (2014) showed a single 800 mg dose of
the D2/3 antagonist sulpiride impaired choice performance for
probabilistic rewards without affecting responses to punish-
ment in healthy male volunteers—no females were studied.
Superficially, the result from Eisenegger et al. (2014) may
seem at odds with our reward and punishment learning find-
ings; however, several key differences between their experi-
ment and ours appear to account for the discrepancy. While
their task was also probabilistic, there were no reversals, and
they tested appetitive and aversive learning in separate blocks
(gain of money versus nil, or loss of money versus nil).
Sulpiride and amisulpride are similar; both are from the
benzamine class of atypical antipsychotics. For the treatment
of psychosis, a normal dose of amisulpride is 400–800 mg per
day, whereas the range for sulpiride is 400–2400 mg per day
(www.medicines.org.uk). Critically, the higher dose used in
their study could have led to greater striatal D2 occupancy.
Indeed, a single 800 mg dose of sulpiride has been reported
to occupy ~ 60% of striatal dopamine D2 receptors (Takano
et al. 2006), whereas a single 400 mg dose of sulpiride oc-
cupies ~ 30% in healthy volunteers (Mehta et al. 2008). This is
especially important because the pharmacological effects in
Eisenegger et al. (2014) were driven by participants who
achieved higher blood levels of sulpiride and by individuals
with genetic variation associated with diminished D2 receptor
expression. Presumably those with lower D2 receptor
expression are disproportionately sensitive to D2/3
modulation. In fact, they found no effects on their classical
or Bayesian analyses for participants with a low blood
sulpiride level, determined by median split. Using classical
statistics, Eisenegger et al. (2014) reported a selective impair-
ment on the reward but not punishment component; however,
this was limited to a late phase after learning had reached
asymptote, suggesting behavioural expression rather than
learning was disrupted; this complicates comparison with
PRL. In line with this, in a Bayesian analysis, they found
sulpiride increased a temperature parameter in the appeti-
tive domain only, which reflects increased choice
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switching. Eisenegger et al. (2014) also found sulpiride did
not affect the learning rate in their appetitive or aversive
component, regardless of blood levels or genetics; task de-
sign again precludes meaningful comparison. Finally, be-
cause their genetic data on the D2 receptor and their effects
of a nonselective D2/3 agent aligned, they were able to infer
their results were driven by D2 modulation, which was not
possible in our study. Differences in the task contingencies
and feedback structure between our task and theirs, the
drug dose, and variation of D2 receptor density likely ac-
count for the discrepancies between results.
Consideration of medication status
It is important to note that most of those in the OCD group
were medicated with SSRIs, which are known to affect dopa-
minergic signalling (Pogarell et al. 2005) and also modulate
PRL. A single dose of an SSRI, more specifically, has pro-
moted hypersensitivity to negative feedback in rats and
healthy humans, and subchronic dosing has improved perfor-
mance in rats (Bari et al. 2010; Chamberlain et al. 2006;
Skandali et al. 2018). The hypersensitivity to negative feed-
back seen in unmedicated depression (Taylor Tavares et al.
2008) was also present in depressed individuals treated with
SSRIs (Murphy et al. 2003), and PRL deficits in OCD persist
despite SSRI use as well (Ersche et al. 2011; Hauser et al.
2017; Remijnse et al. 2006). A possible explanation is that
SSRIs do not modulate serotonergic activity in the OFC as
readily as in other parts of the frontal cortex (El Mansari et al.
1995), and OFC abnormalities are present in depression
(Bremner et al. 2002), as well as in OCD.
Implications for treatment
Our results are important for informing and refining treat-
ment approaches. While there have been no randomised
placebo controlled clinical trials of amisulpride for the
treatment of OCD, other D2/3 antagonists are often used
as an effective augmentation of first-line SSRI therapy in
treatment resistant cases of OCD (Fineberg et al. 2013).
At the same time, no studies have assessed the clinical
efficacy of the D2/3 agonist pramipexole for OCD. There
have been numerous studies testing dopaminergic agonists
for the treatment of SUD; however, evidence for their
clinical efficacy is currently lacking (Minozzi et al.
2015). To our knowledge, there has been no clinical trial
of amisulpride for the treatment of SUD. Existing studies
testing other D2/3 antagonists have mostly found a lack of
clinical benefit for SUD, or even a worsening of symp-
toms; however, multiple studies have found D2/3 antago-
nists to reduce cravings in those with comorbid psychosis
(Zhornitsky et al. 2010).
Conclusion
We have, to our knowledge, conducted the first compari-
son of the computational processes underlying two disor-
ders of compulsivity, and their dopaminergic modulation.
We have shown that an RL model captured mechanisms
that differed between individuals with SUD, OCD, and
healthy controls, and also detected changes following do-
paminergic drug administration. The parameters in our
model revealed subtleties underlying maladaptive behav-
iour that considerably extend conventional analyses of
PRL. One key novel finding was that the stimulus stick-
iness parameter differentiated all three groups, with op-
posing effects in SUD and OCD. Behaviour in SUD was
driven primarily by a combination of increased stimulus
stickiness and an imbalance of learning from positive ver-
sus negative feedback—decreased positive and increased
negative feedback learning. The altered computations un-
derlying performance in OCD, on the other hand, were a
decrease in stimulus stickiness and an increase in learning
from negative feedback. D2/3 modulation normalised the
stimulus stickiness anomalies in SUD, in particular, and
reversed deficits in other parameters as well. Our compu-
tational analysis allowed for a more nuanced cross-species
comparison of the neural basis of PRL, with implications
for its neurochemical modulation. The results, taken in the
context of the existing literature, highlight the importance
of considering how drug dose, receptor subtypes and ex-
pression, clinical phenotype, and subtleties of the task
environment—the salience of feedback, deterministic or
probabilistic reinforcement, single or serial reversals, and
the role of uncertainty—may interact to affect behaviour
and its underlying computational structure. By using
Bayesian hierarchical modelling, we can begin to under-
stand the subtle mechanisms that contribute to maladap-
tive responses on tests of behavioural flexibility, and their
neurochemical basis in health and disease. This may even-
tually inform susceptibility to illness, diagnosis, and
treatment.
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